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The paper develops a conceptual framework to advance understanding of the institutional structure 
of the economy and to enrich the philosophical basis of institutional economics. To achieve this, 
key elements from the tradition of Original Institutional Economics (OIE) are subsumed into the 
philosophical platform of Critical Realism (CR). The paper starts by outlining the conceptual 
foundations of OIE before moving on to delineate the philosophical tenets of CR. Together these 
provide the basis for the development of a stratified ontological framework discussing institutional 
economic organisation. In particular, a three-layer, interlocked reality is identified, where deeper 
tendencies and qualities of the human essence (understood as ‘creativity’, ‘emulation’ and 
‘culture’) condition the institutional environment (differentiated in economic, political, legal, and 
social terms) which, in turn, constitutes the terrain upon which organisational arrangements are 
manifested and socioeconomic events are actualised. The paper concludes by outlining the 
epistemological and methodological implications, which provide the grounds for the development 
of a generic analytical framework that can be used to investigate the institutional texture of the 
socioeconomic environment. 
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  11. Introduction 
 
The paper aims to reorient Original Institutional Economics (OIE) around Critical Realism (CR) 
philosophical lines and upon these foundations to develop an ontological model of socioeconomic 
organisation which explicitly places institutional structures at the forefront of economic analysis.  
 
It is generally acknowledged that the OIE of Thorstein Veblen and John R. Commons accepted 
pragmatism as the philosophical basis of their economic thought (Mirowski, 1987). However, 
contemporary OIE does not necessarily presume pragmatism, since the school comprises a mixture 
of approaches informed by a number of philosophical standpoints. Thus, while the American strand 
of OIE has clung to its pragmatist heritage, European OIE streams have been receptive to other 
philosophical interpretations (Bush, 1993).  
 
CR is a recent philosophical movement, increasingly influential in economics and other social 
sciences. Its strong point is its explicit ontological perspective (dealing with what really exists and 
how reality is constituted and realised) or ‘meta-theory’ in which specific theories can be nested for 
a fresh and more fruitful approach to economic explanation. In this sense CR has very much played 
the role of ‘underlabourer’, embracing and ontologically enriching a wide variety of approaches, 
not only in economics, but also in other social sciences (Fleetwood, 1999). 
 
OIE on the whole has much to gain, and certainly nothing to fear, from its engagement with the CR 
ontology. A thorough understanding of the underlying reality of its subject matter will enhance its 
conceptions, improve its thinking, encourage communication with other economic approaches and, 
overall, will provide a much robust institutional edifice (Lawson, 2003). This applies also to the 
specific strand of American OIE, which, according to Lawson (2003), has moved too far in the 
direction of relativism. Furthermore, there is normative point here; those who, following Veblen 
(1898), intend treating ‘economics as an evolutionary science’ need to be open to new ideas and 
developments in the philosophical discourse.   
 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 sheds light on the conceptual underpinnings of OIE, 
whereas section 3 sets out the ontological and epistemological principles of CR. On these bases the 
development of a stratified ontological framework delineating the institutional nature of the 
socioeconomy is undertaken in section 4. Section 5 discusses the methodological implications of 




  22. Outlining original institutional economics 
 
Having been displaced from the forefront of economic thought for over half a century, OIE has 
recently seen a considerable renaissance and proliferation of interest from a new generation of 
institutionalist thinkers in the US and Europe. Although complete agreement on the philosophical 
and methodological issues is still lacking, there is a relatively common set of beliefs that unite 
‘original institutionalism’ at both theoretical and applied levels (Samuels, 1995). These are 
discussed below.  
 
Original institutionalists recognise the complexity of economic life and stress the need for a holistic 
and societal approach. The economy, they argue, should be understood and analysed as an open 
system in continuous dynamic interaction with the cultural, social, political, legal and physical 
systems from which economic processes receive important impulses and upon which they exert 
their own influences (Hamilton, 1919; Kapp, 1976). Hence, OIE views economic processes as 
embedded in social relations, economic institutions as only part of the wider set of socio-cultural 
institutions, economic agents as social beings, and, in short, the socioeconomy as an integrated 
system (Granovetter, 1985; Hodgson, 1998).  
 
Society is more than a mere aggregation of autonomous individuals; it also comprises values, 
beliefs, customs and norms, which have cultural underpinnings and cannot be fully explained in 
purely individualistic terms (Veblen, 1919a; Ayres, 1962). Hence, OIE renounces methodological 
individualism, which assigns ontological and explanatory primacy to an immutable, institution-free 
atomic agent. However, the alternative model does not necessarily imply a methodological 
collectivism, which explains the individual entirely in terms of the institutional-cultural 
environment
1. Although human behaviour is largely influenced by the economic, political, social 
and cultural framework, it is also adaptive and purposeful, and individuals can also act to form and 
alter institutions too (Veblen, 1919a; Hamilton, 1919; Commons, 1931; Hodgson, 1988; Samuels, 
1995). The individual is, therefore, both the producer and the product of his/her institutional 
environment, in a process of continuous interaction and evolutionary change. 
 
Original institutionalists also reject the model of ‘rational economic man’, stressing the habitual 
and routinised character of human behaviour (Veblen, 1919a; Commons, 1934; Stanfield, 1999). 
The various actions that a person undertakes are so complex, and the amount of sensory data 
received so enormous, that he/she resorts to habits or social practices in order to diminish conscious 
                                                 
1 However, some strands of post-1940 American institutionalism espoused an ‘oversocialised’ view of human 
behaviour, and have been criticised for methodological collectivism and cultural determinism (Rutherford, 
1994; Hodgson, 1998). Such one-sided emphasis is absent from the original institutionalism of Veblen and 
Commons. 
  3thought and reduce fatigue (Hodgson, 1988, 1997). These practices, however, are defined within a 
cultural context, as it is culture that legitimises and habituates some beliefs and actions, while 
discouraging others, so as to organise human life and ensure its regularity. Human rationality need 
not be the outcome of a conscious act of reasoning, but is often embodied in a socio-cultural and 
historical process. 
 
Institutions have a cognitive dimension, providing a framework for interpreting sense data and 
transforming information into meaningful knowledge (Veblen, 1914; Hodgson, 1988, 1998). This 
cognitive function of institutions explains not only their relative stability and capacity to replicate, 
but also their ability to reduce instability and uncertainty in human affairs. The strong interaction 
between institutions and individual cognition can account for some significant stability in 
socioeconomic systems, partly by buffering and constraining the diverse actions of the agents 
(Hodgson, 1996) and partly by providing relatively reliable information regarding their likely 
behaviour to other agents (Hodgson, 1988). 
 
OIE perceives economic organisation in a dynamic context, seeking to understand the process and 
mechanisms through which the socioeconomic system changes and evolves (Veblen, 1919a; 
Hamilton, 1919; Ayres, 1962). Veblen (1919a: 74-75) writes: “The economic life … is a 
cumulative process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, 
both the agent and his environment being at any point the outcome of the last process”. This means 
that alongside the exogenous ‘shocks’ to the system (that is, the changing exigencies of the life 
process), endogenous institutions and human agency determine the course of socio-economic 
change in an accumulative, incremental way. However, such a conception does not imply any 
prejudgement either for the direction or the outcomes of the cumulative response. The 
socioeconomy is seen as a complex and open-ended system where the variety of possibilities for 
interdependencies could account for widely differing outcomes (Kapp, 1976). 
 
One of the key forces in the process of evolution is ‘technology’. The beginning of such a 
perception is identifiable in Veblen’s distinction between two tendencies that, he argues, are 
present to a different degree in all human societies. Technological or instrumental frames of mind 
are connected to the intrinsic human propensity for ‘workmanship’, ‘idle curiosity’ and creative 
innovation, and refer to the ceaseless advance in scientific understanding involving development of 
‘matter-of-fact’ knowledge and reasoning from cause to effect. Ceremonial or pecuniary frames of 
mind, in contrast, are related to the predatory aptitude of human behaviour, settled upon and 
habitually reproduced to serve ‘invidious’ or ‘leisure class’ interests, legitimising emulation, 
aggression, dominance and abstention from productive work, as accepted schemes of life, and 
using the established status-quo and traditions for their warrant. Thus, whereas the instrumental 
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ceremonial facets are predatory, past-binding, resistant to progress and change, and thus restrictive 
or even destructive to economic development (Ayres, 1962). The result is an evolving 
socioeconomic system, driven by status emulation, conflict and power relations, where, within the 
context of technological process and under the stress of the exigencies of associated life, old 
institutions break down and new ones are created in the continuous process of adaptation to 
changing circumstances. This is frequently referred to as the Veblenian dichotomy and constitutes a 
central analytical tool in the Veblen-Ayres strand of American institutionalism (Dugger, 1979; 
Miller, 1978; Wisman and Rozansky, 1991). 
 
Another strand of original institutionalism, traced to Commons, takes a much more favourable 
view of the role of institutions than Veblen. Commons (1931, 1934, 1950) sees institutions as 
problem-solving instruments that evolve out of the need for ‘workability’ in a process involving a 
close interaction between spontaneous actions and conscious efforts at institutional design. The 
cumulative effect of ‘collective action’ taken over time by the members of a ‘going concern’ (that 
is any type of community, such as a family, a firm, a union, or a whole state) is the development of 
‘working rules’ that determine “…what the individual can, cannot, must, must not, may or may not 
do” (Commons, 1931: 650), providing a basis for settling conflicts and for establishing order in 
economic life. Working rules are codified in the legal framework of statutes, decisions of courts 
and administrative bodies, or in the less formal sense of prescribed behaviour (i.e. customs) of 
going concerns. So, while Commons accepted the Veblenian dichotomy, his depiction of 
evolutionary dynamics emphasises the application of creativity to the design of institutions 
themselves more than the continual conflict between instrumental creativity and ceremonial inertia 
(Rutherford, 1983). 
 
The philosophical underpinnings of original institutionalism owe a great deal to American 
pragmatism, a movement developed in the US at the turn of the 20
th century by Charles S. Peirce, 
William James and later by John Dewey
2. Pragmatism starts from the fundamental humanistic 
thesis that actions are structured by meanings which are subjective interpretations of the world, but 
it goes further to argue that these interpretations are evaluated in terms of their ‘practical’ 
implications (Peirce, 1877, 1905; James, 1907; Dewey, 1929, 1939b). Choices, therefore, are based 
on criteria of utility, providing a standard for the determination of truth in the case of statements, 
rightness in the case of actions, and value in the case of appraisals. No universal, objective, secure 
or permanent anchor exists to guarantee true knowledge. Knowledge is the outcome of a process of 
interpretation and conceptualisation of experiences by a self-identified community of inquiry, 
                                                 
2 Both Commons (1934) and Ayres (1962) explicitly recognise the direct influence of Dewey in their 
institutionalism. 
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and action to the overall betterment of human life as a whole. Thus, the perception and 
interpretation of the world (and thus reality too) is, substantially a socio-cultural process, where the 
community of inquiry is the basic epistemological unit.  
 
Having embraced such a philosophical position OIE espouses a holistic view of the world, where 
economy, politics, legal processes and social structures are conceptualised as an integrated, unified 
whole, or synthesis, and not as logically separated structures and processes (Mirowski, 1987). This 
holistic perception is couched in the belief that the whole is not only greater than the sum of its 
parts, and so is not deducible from its parts, but also that the parts are so interrelated that their 
functioning is conditioned by the whole to which they belong. Along these lines, Wilber and 
Harrison (1978: 71) define the original institutional approach to economics as holistic, systemic 
and evolutionary; it is “…holistic because it focuses on the pattern of relations among parts and the 
whole, … systemic because it believes that those parts make up a coherent whole and can be 
understood only in terms of the whole, … [and] evolutionary because changes in the pattern of 
relations are seen as the very essence of social reality” (Wilber and Harrison, 1978, p. 71). 
Meaning, on these grounds, is linked to the context, whereas entities or activities are assumed to be 
truly comprehensible only through their interrelations with other entities or activities.  
 
The technique of investigation of OIE is an amalgamation of history and comparative analysis 
where historical situations or cases are systematically recounted and compared in an effort to 
discern a pattern or general element (Atkinson and Oleson, 1996). This particular mode of research 
is called ‘pattern model’ or ‘storytelling’ (Wilber and Harrison, 1978). At the heart of the pattern 
model investigatory mode is an inductive, empirical analysis based on evaluating and synthesising 
context-specific historical evidence. To effect analysis, the mode relies primarily upon case studies, 
wherein the preference for the narrative format is evident. Original institutionalists, however, do 
not stop at pure description; they develop theory by examining cases for similarities and 
differences, and identifying the critical or strategic factors controlling a situation (Stanfield, 1999). 
Theory development, nevertheless, is oriented towards explanation rather than prediction. 
 
As already noted, the methodological tenets of OIE emanate from the philosophy of pragmatism. 
This relationship is at least partly explained by the historical origins of institutional economics. The 
pragmatist philosophical basis of institutionalism is a legacy from the age of Veblen and Commons 
and can be understood as the result of lock-in or ‘path dependence’ from the original formulations 
of the approach. Contemporary developments in philosophy of social sciences have introduced 
alternative perspectives to socioeconomic research and, arguably, have advanced discussion in the 
methodology and practice of economics. Stimulated by such arguments, contemporary original 
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Bush (1993) for example, have suggested an intellectual recombination of key elements of 
pragmatism with critical realism. Others, such as Hodgson (1993, 1998) and Samuels (1990) 
question the feasibility of their reconciliation, but by placing emphasis on the structural nature of 
institutions
3 they are receptive to structuralist philosophical interpretations. However, despite its 
apparent potential, relatively little work has been done towards the philosophical redefinition of 
institutionalism along structuralist or critical realist lines. 
 
 
3. The philosophical bases of critical realism  
 
Critical realism
4 has certain advantages over other philosophical perspectives in discussing the 
institutional organisation of the socioeconomy (Lawson, 1997a; Fleetwood, 1999). These mainly 
stem from its ontological account that allows the dissociation of institutional structure from human 
agency without undermining its agent-dependent nature. This is important because it enables a neat  
and elegant identification and analysis of the institutional qualities, mechanisms and causal powers 
that characterise the economic system. Moreover, the fact that the CR ontology (or ‘meta-theory’) 
is compatible with a variety of approaches in heterodox economics (Outhwaite, 1990; Sayer, 1992) 
renders its fusion with institutionalism on the whole both valid and feasible. 
 
The CR perception of the social world is based on three fundamental premises about social reality 
(Archer et al, 1998). First, the world is comprised of objects that are ‘structured’ and ‘intransitive’: 
structured in the sense that they cannot be reduced to the events of experience and intransitive in 
the sense that they exist and act independently of their identification and the knowledge of which 
they are the objects. Hence, the world is constituted not only by events or states of affairs, and our 
experiences or perceptions of those actualities, but also by ‘deep’ structures, mechanisms, 
tendencies and their relations that, although they may not be directly detectable, nevertheless exist 
and govern the actual events as well as what we experience, understand and do
5. Such a distinction 
                                                 
3 Institutions, it is argued, are not only “…‘subjective’ ideas in the head of agents…” but also “…‘objective’ 
structures faced by them” (Hodgson, 1998: 181). 
4 Critical realism (which sometimes is also known as critical naturalism) is mainly associated with the work 
of Roy Bhaskar (1975, 1979, 1989) and represents a link or dialogue between humanist and structuralist 
approaches.  
5 Lawson (1995) neatly illustrates this with an example from the physical world discussing the falling of an 
autumn leaf. He points out that, not only does the leaf pass to the ground, and this is experienced as falling, 
but this is in fact a complex movement specified by real mechanisms (such as gravitational, aerodynamic, 
thermodynamic, electromagnetic and other interactive forces) and their relations. 
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6, institutions, mechanisms, processes and tendencies) 
and transitive objects of knowledge (such as events, observations, theories, hypotheses, etc.
7) 
precludes any anthropocentric definition of ontology (that is, defining reality and what exists on the 
sole basis of human senses and experience), and the subsequent collapse of the ontological into the 
epistemological realm (that is, confusing what exists with what can be known to exist). The latter 
also highlights the significance of ontological determination as an essential step in any social 
inquiry.  
 
Furthermore, CR sustains a clear conception of the existential-intransitive dimension of objects 
without underestimating the relativity (i.e. activity or concept dependence) and historical 
transitivity of knowledge. Thus, emphasis on ‘ontological realism’ (the proposition that there are 
true entities which exist and act independently of our knowledge of them) is complemented by an 
‘epistemological relativism’, the thesis that the only way to know and express these entities is 
“…via human mediation in cognitive discourse”
8 (Lawson, 1997a: 241). Note, however, that such 
an assertion does not imply that knowledge is infallible, nor that there is only one supreme or 
correct understanding of the world. What is plainly maintained is that the world can be understood 
only through the available conceptual resources, where different standpoints provide different (yet 
valid to a degree) perspectives of the world, but not determine the structure of the world itself. In 
that sense, a distinction between existential and causal interdependence is acknowledged, where 
intransitive social entities are existentially independent of, but causally interdependent with, the 
processes by which they are known (Archer et al, 1998). 
 
On the basis of this conceptualisation, which distinguishes between our knowledge of these entities 
and their independent reality of being, knowledge is inevitably seen as the endless social activity of 
understanding and expressing these true entities (Sayer, 1992). This implies that knowledge is 
never created out of nothing. Rather, it can only be a produced means of cognition, where revised 
understandings are achieved via the update or transformation of existing conceptions, hypotheses 
                                                 
6 Most realists (Sayer, 1992; Lawson, 1997a; Archer et al, 1998) employ the concept of structure to describe 
socially embedded sets of relations through which social objects, positions or practices are interdependently 
constituted (e.g. those of master and slave, landlord and tenant, employer and employee, etc).  
7 These are regarded as transitive objects in the sense that, although they refer to states or properties of 
intransitive entities, they are in fact thought products or outcomes of human discourse that are based on some 
predefined conceptual systems (Sayer, 1992). 
8 In response to those readers that, on the basis of this assertion, may be tempted to contest the validity of 
ontological realism (i.e. to argue that it is irrelevant, unnecessary, or simply a fallacy to believe that there are 
intransitively existing entities if their existence can only be postulated in thought) it must be answered that 
“…what we see gives us reasonable grounds for supporting [the notion] that the world is not our own 
invention even though the concept ‘world’ undoubtedly is. … For it is precisely because the world does not 
yield to just any kind of expectation that we believe it exists independently of us and it is not simply a 
figment of our imagination” (Sayer, 1992: 67, emphasis in the original).  
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9, internal intelligibility and consistency, as 
well as coherence to the overall existing conceptual framework (Yeung 1997; Fleetwood, 1999). In 
short, CR regards knowledge as both a social process and product, which is historically and 
culturally specific, symbolically mediated and expressed, and, as such, not only fallible but also 
theory-laden, practice-dependent and value-impregnated.  
 
The second core premise of CR relates to the ‘stratified’ nature of the social world. The notion of 
stratification enables the differentiation of reality in distinct domains, or strata, which, though 
unsynchronised or out of phase (that is, operating and changing on different time frames), are seen 
as interconnected with one another
10 (Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 1992; Lawson, 1995, 1997a). What 
relates and connects one layer with another is the phenomenon of ‘emergence’. According to this 
notion, each level of reality is assumed to exhibit entities or aspects which emerge from and depend 
upon entities found at another layer of reality (Lawson, 1997a). However, these entities display a 
degree of taxonomic and causal autonomy from the level from which they emerged, in virtue of the 
real essences, intrinsic structures, complex interrelations and organisational potentialities of the 
stratum in which they exist. This autonomy prevents entities formed at a particular level of reality 
from being reducible to those entities, found at other levels, from which they have emerged. On 
these grounds differentiation of one layer from another is established, reaffirming the lack of 
‘synchrony’ between them (Archer et  al, 1998). Moreover, this autonomy is marked by the 
existence of separate and additional causal powers and qualities that are absent from the entities 
located in other strata of reality. In particular, these emergent entities have the ability to frame (that 
is to constrain, enable or simply to influence), and cause changes to, important attributes, powers 
and dispositions of the basic layer from which they have emerged
11,12. However, this causal effect, 
                                                 
9 Note that this idea of ‘practical’ or pragmatic evaluation of knowledge is similar to the one developed by 
the pragmatist tradition. 
10 Realists seem to perceive the notion of stratification in two complementary dimensions. The first 
dimension (which comes directly from Bhaskar’s writings and is equally applicable to both social and natural 
realms) highlights the distinction between the three ontological domains: the empirical, the actual, and the 
real. The second dimension, which is more relevant to social analysis, emphasises a view of reality consisting 
of hierarchical ordered levels, where the lower one creates the conditions for the higher one. Although this 
perspective is relatively underdeveloped and subject to an ongoing debate (concerning, for example, which 
levels exist and what is their relation), a very general and simplified but, for the purpose of the current 
discussion, sufficient way of describing the ordering between some of the most important levels is, according 
to Danermark (2001), as follows: 
- social level 
- psychological level 
- biological level 
- molecular level. 
Note that a similar line of argument can also be found in some original institutionalist writings such as Ayres 
(1962) and Hodgson (2000, 2003). 
11 This is termed by Hodgson (2000, 2003) ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ and it is argued that this 
constitutes the key insight and defining characteristic of the original institutionalist tradition.  
12 This quality also safeguards from the danger of structural determinism as developed, for example, in some 
structuralist or American institutionalist writings.  
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disrupt or destroy the intransitive subsistence and existential status of that level (Sperry, 1991). In 
that sense some order is sustained at each level, and in reality as a whole, alongside complexity, 
contingency, plurality, openness and dynamism. 
 
Finally, CR insists on the ‘transfactuality’ and ‘openness’ of social structures. In short the argument 
states that the underlying generative mechanisms, structures and institutions operate independently 
of the closure or otherwise of the systems in which they occur (Bhaskar, 1975). Their activities are 
continuous and invariant, stemming from their relatively enduring properties, powers and 
liabilities, and thus constantly operate independently of both the conditions for their actualisation 
and their actual realisation. However, although these generative qualities are always present, they 
may be “…possessed unexercised, exercised unactualized, and actualized undetected or 
unperceived”
13 (Archer et al, 1998: xii), depending upon ‘contingently related conditions’, which 
determine whether and, if so, which countervailing mechanisms would be activated or released
14 
(Dow, 2002). On this basis, the mechanisms and powers of the underlying structures and 
institutions should be seen and analysed as transfactual or ‘universal’, though they are expressed 
and manifested in more or less historically-specific and highly differentiated forms.  
 
It must be highlighted at this point that this final premise of realism does not imply that entities of 
social reality are immutable. Indeed, as Bhaskar (1979, 1989), Sayer (1992), Archer (1995) and 
Lawson (1997a), clearly indicate, one of the defining features of the social world is its potential to 
change its shape or form as a result of the conception, reflection and action of purposeful human 
agency
15. Thus, since realists insist upon a stratified view of social reality, they accept that “…there 
are properties and powers particular to people which include a reflexivity towards and creativity 
about any social context which they confront” (Archer et al, 1998: 190). From this conception, the 
‘transformational model of social activity’ emerges, emphasising that social life possesses a non-
teleologically but historically evolving character by virtue of the agents’ potential continually to re-
interpret, and collectively reproduce and transform, the social reality they confront.    
 
                                                 
13 A power is possessed by an entity by virtue of its intrinsic structure, it can be exercised unactualised due to 
counterbalanced interference of other exercised powers, or actualised if it is not deflected by the effects of 
other powers. 
14 Not surprisingly then, depending on conditions, the operation of the same mechanism, tendency, etc., can 
produce quite different results and, alternatively, different mechanisms may produce the same empirical 
results (e.g. an effect such as the loss of jobs may be caused by either the introduction of a new technology or 
by failure to introduce it – the latter being due to reduction of competitiveness and closing down) (Sayer, 
1992). 
15 Following Lawson (1997a) agency is differentiated from action in the sense that the former refers to the 
intrinsic powers and capabilities of human beings whereas the latter refers to their exercise. 
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discussion on the nature of social structures and their connection with human agency. From the 
outset, the realist understanding of social structures, and social phenomena in general, entails a 
‘relational conception of the subject-matter of the social sciences’ arguing that all social entities 
(structures, institutions, but also human agency as well) presuppose a social context and depend 
upon social relations for their existence. In this sense it is true to say that social structures would 
not exist without human activity, as well as to say that such human activity would not occur unless 
the agents engaging in it had a conception of what they are doing
16,17 (something which 
presupposes the prior existence of social forms) (Bhaskar, 1979; Archer et al, 1998). On this basis 
the concept-dependence, activity-dependence and space-time specificity of social structures is 
identified.  
 
However, it is equally important to acknowledge at this point the intransitive dimension of social 
structures. Thus, although social structures depend upon agents’ conceptions (which may be 
distorted, incomplete, inadequate, or simply inappropriately conceptualised due to their evolving 
character), they exist intransitively and, so, function independently of their appropriate 
conceptualisation (Archer et al, 1998). To sum up, it can be said that social structures are regarded 
as both the ever-present condition and the outcome of human agency (defined as perception, 
conception, reflection and action), where people both reproduce and transform the very structures 
that they utilise for their activities in a recursive and non-teleological manner (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: The transformational model of the structure/agency connection 
 
 










However, there is an important asymmetry here: at any moment in time social structures are pre-
given for individuals who do not create them, but merely reproduce or transform them in their 
substantive activities (Archer, 1995, 2000). To put it bluntly, as individuals we do not make social 
structures: they are there in some form at our birth, bearing the properties and powers that have 
                                                 
16 Such conceptions can be held consciously as well as unconsciously (or implicitly) by the human agents 
(Bhaskar, 1979; Archer et al, 1998; Lawson, 1997a, 1997b). 
17 This is a fundamental insight borrowed from the pragmatist tradition (e.g. see Peirce, 1877, 1878). 
  11emerged as a result of actions taken, and behaviour followed by human beings of the past
18,19. This 
means that social structures (although they exist – sustained or modified – as a result of the totality 
of human activities) always pre-date the individual and provide (transcendentally and causally) the 
necessary condition for human behaviour and action. These causal powers proclaim the reality of 
social structures whereas their pre-existence establishes their relative autonomy as distinct objects 
of scientific investigation. On that basis, the ontological (and methodological) ‘separability’ of 
social structure and human agency is recognised
20 whereby it becomes clear that, by virtue of the 
different emergent properties and causal powers they possess, social structures and human agency 
belong in two distinct strata of social reality which are usually out of synchrony (Lawson, 1997a; 
Archer et al, 1998) (see Figure 1). 
 
It is evident from the above that a system of unifying concepts is required, designated the ‘point of 
contact’ between human agency and social structures. Such a mediating system, linking action to 
structure, is the enduring social relations that are conceptualised as holding between “…positions 
(places, functions, rules, tasks, duties, rights, etc) occupied (filled, assumed, enacted, etc.) by 
individuals, and practises (activities, etc.) in which, by virtue of their occupancy of these positions 
(and vice versa), they engage”
21 (Archer et al, 1998: 221, emphasis in the original). A similar 
position is also evident in various institutionalist writings. Commons (1931), Granovetter (1985) 
and Searle (2005), for instance, view institutional structures as defining, and being defined by, the 
correlative and reciprocal relations between individuals. 
 
Given the realist conception of social structure developed so far, and the institutionalist theorisation 
elaborated in the previous section, it is now possible to move towards an understanding and 
definition of institutions as special types of social structures. Interestingly Lawson (1997a: 318) 
indicates a useful direction at this point, suggesting that the term ‘institution’ be used “…to 
designate those systems, or structured processes of interaction (collecting together rules, relations 
and positions as well as habits and other practices), that are relatively enduring and identified as 
such”. Taking this comment into account, institutions are viewed here as ingrained regularities or 
                                                 
18 It is in this sense, i.e. by reference to the past activities, positions, practices and concepts of former (even 
deceased) human agents, that both the activity-dependence, concept-dependence and space-time specificity 
character of social structures can be affirmed and validated (Archer, 1995; Lawson, 1997a). 
19 It is worth pointing out that original institutionalists seem to uphold a similar position here (see for 
example Bush, 1987; Samuels, 1995; Hodgson, 1998, 2003). Commons (1934: 45), for instance, writes: 
“…we do not start as isolated individuals – we start in infancy with discipline and obedience, and we 
continue as members of concerns already going”. Similarly Veblen (1899: 191) argues: “The institutions … 
under the guidance of which men live are in this way received from an earlier time; more or less remotely 
earlier, but in any event they have been elaborated in and received from the past. Institutions are products of 
the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with the 
requirements of the present”. 
20 This is the celebrated notion of dualism.  
21 Note once again that these relations, though they depend upon the concepts that agents hold (consciously 
or unconsciously), exist independently of their appropriate conceptualisation. 
  12established rules of human life
22 that define agents’ perception, thought, behaviour and 
expectations, providing certainty and order in social interaction and economic organisation. 
 
Institutions, like all social structures, are products of human society, meaning that they exist, are 
reproduced and transformed, only by virtue of it. On this basis, institutions do not exist 
independently of the activities, practices and relationships they govern, or the agents’ conceptions 
(beliefs, values, etc), mental attitudes (including habits and routines) and psycho-biological 
capacities (Veblen, 1899, 1914; Hamilton, 1919, Ayres, 1962; DeGregori, 1977; Jensen, 1994). 
However, institutions cannot be reduced to, or identified with, human agency. They are not only 
out of phase with the human activities they facilitate but, as products of the processes and 
circumstances of the past, are “…never in full accord with the requirements of the present” 
(Veblen, 1899: 191). Thus, it becomes clear that they belong in a distinct layer of reality with its 
own causal powers and emergent properties. Moreover, based on this notion of ‘separability’ 
between structure and agency, institutionalism, in line with the CR conceptualisation, warrants 
institutions with temporal priority (i.e. pre-existence), relative autonomy and causal efficacy over 
human agency. On that basis it can be argued with Hodgson (1998, 2000) that institutions are 
simultaneously social structures and ideational representations
23, that have the ability to form and 
mould the capacities and behaviour of human agency (groups as well as individuals) in 
fundamental ways.  
 
The basic function of institutions is to ensure certainty and continuity in social and economic life 
and, as such, they are characterised by relative stability, self-reinforcement and capacity to 
replicate. Once they are in place and acted upon, they come to endure merely through being an 
outcome of the day-to-day activities of individuals ‘going on’ in life. On the basis of this continuity 
and persistence, institutions provide some kind of ‘quasi-closure’ in the agents’ decision making 
and ultimately to the overall, essentially open, socioeconomic system. However, this does not mean 
that they are immutable; they are manmade and changeable. In fact, institutions seem to evolve in a 
relatively slow but dynamic and apparently incremental fashion, a process characterised by 
‘cumulative causation’ and ‘path dependence’ (Veblen, 1919a; North 1990), through both non-
deliberative (i.e. habitual and customary) and deliberative (typically legal) modes (Samuels, 1995). 
It is on that basis that institutional change is seen as a never ending evolutionary process of 
                                                 
22 In general a distinction between rule-following and routinised behaviour is recognised on the basis that the 
former is drawn upon in the course of action whereas the latter involves automatic action (Lawson, 1997a). 
However it is important to recall the interrelation between the two, highlighted by the OIE, where rules are 
nothing more than empty declarations if they are not ingrained in the customs, and habits of the community 
(Hodgson, 2006). 
23 It is important to acknowledge that institutional structures can exist without being adequately 
conceptualised by agents, or without being conceptualised at all. This is because it is through human actions 
taken in total that they come about and endure, whether or not individual agents have an awareness that, or 
precisely how, this is so. 
  13adaptation to the changing experiences, exigencies and circumstances of human life. Yet, nothing 
in this assertion implies an economically efficient, deterministic or teleological perception with 
regard to institutional evolution. This is because it is human agency (characterised by variety in 
rationality and behaviour) in relation to other ‘contingently related conditions’ (such as 
unpredictable events and shocks) that plays a decisive role in shaping the course of institutional 
change.  
 
In keeping with the arguments outlined above it is now possible to introduce a stratified ontological 
framework providing a robust basis for a holistic conceptualisation of the institutionalist 
understanding of socioeconomy.  
 
 
4. An ontological framework of socioeconomic organisation 
 
As stated above, the realist philosophical perspective is employed by virtue of its ability to address 
the richness, multidimensionality and complexity of the socioeconomic world, so far outlined as 
intrinsically structured, open, dynamic, and characterised by emergence, ‘irrationality’, 
contingency, creativity and thus novelty. The resultant model, which can be seen in Figure 2, puts 
forward such an ontological interpretation bringing together key insights from OIE and the 
unifying philosophical approach of CR. In particular, a three-layered, interlocked socioeconomic 
reality is envisaged whereby each level possesses unique properties and exhibits qualities that 
depend upon and are conditioned by the elements developed in other levels. On these grounds, the 
autonomy and differentiation of each level is sustained alongside their interconnection, interaction 
and interdependence.  
 
The bottom-most stratum is the level where the ‘deeper’ mechanisms and tendencies lie, 
intrinsically conditioning the ‘run’ of the whole socioeconomy. Having subscribed to the ‘relational 
conception of social entities’ (the argument that structures/institutions and human agency are all 
entities that presuppose each other for their existence and co-evolution) and the fact that nothing 
whatsoever can happen (in terms of social forms, history, etc.) except by and through 
social/collective human action taken at some point in the past, it can be postulated that this layer 
should contain elements not directly attributable to either structure or current agency
24, but to the 
universal traits of human nature. As such, it is in this stratum where the salient characteristics, 
tendencies and qualities of the human essence should be found. These collectively constitute the 
core makeup which is present to some degree in every member of the species, and which therefore 
                                                 
24 This means agency attributed to behavioural capabilities and action of present actors.  
  14rests on a broad basis of humankind. To be precise, however, it is necessary to take their non-static 
nature on board, and to recognise that these basically behavioural propensities are profoundly 
inscribed (moulded, articulated, conditioned, actualised) by a long process of socio-cultural 
evolution. On that basis, a position is espoused here according to which the properties and 
potentialities of the human being are neither pre-determined solely by evolutionary biology, nor 
simply socially appropriated. Rather they emerge historically and through evolution, from our 
relations with our environment which, although they embody the social aspect, are by no means 
reducible to it. 
 
Figure 2: A critical realist interpretation of the institutional economic organisation 
 
 
Source: Own construction 
The ‘deeper’ domain  
(human substance) 
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(institutional framework) 
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In this context, institutionalists (especially Veblen, 1899, 1914, but see also Hamilton, 1919; Ayres, 
1962, Jensen, 1994, Cordes 2005, Wolozin, 2005) have postulated a number of deeper qualities and 
traits, all expressions of the invariant core of human nature, which blend, interact with and are 
interdependent on one another. These are considered to be the propellants that drive humanity 
along its evolutionary path, by shaping habits of thought, beliefs, and criteria of knowledge and 
reality, and providing a basis to construct the canons of conduct which serve as guides and 
standards in socioeconomic life. These are organised here within three wider rubrics: creativity, 
  15emulation and culture
25. 
 
The notion of ‘creativity’ (or ‘technology’
26) is utilised to encompass a variety of characteristics 
and impulsive aptitudes associated with human agency that are considered to be the developmental 
and progressive forces behind any economic, socio-cultural and technological processes to the 
enhancement of the well-being of human life as a whole. Commons (1931, 1934), in this context, 
emphasises the human need for ‘workability’ which drives the development and provision of 
cooperative solutions (i.e. working rules and institutions), establishing order and certainty in the 
course of economic life. Veblen (1899, 1914), on the other hand, identifies the ‘instincts’ of 
‘workmanship’ and ‘idle curiosity’ as universal traits within human nature necessary to advance 
progress and to further human life on the whole. Workmanship refers to this gratifying and 
stimulating inclination humans have towards the accomplishment of some concrete, effective and 
collective end, which is also associated with preference for ‘serviceability’ or efficiency and an 
aversion for futility, waste, or incapacity. The idea of idle curiosity places emphasis on the human 
tendency towards experimentation, creative innovation, speculation and novelty. It is the basis for 
inquiry into knowledge, which leads to new and improved ways of thinking and doing, something 
amply evident on the whole course of economic life. 
 
Alongside creativity, institutionalists (e.g. Veblen, 1899, 1914, 1919b; Commons, 1931, 1950; 
Hamilton, 1953; Ayres, 1962; Miller, 1978; Jensen, 1994) have seen another proclivity of human 
behaviour towards unremitting emulation, possessiveness, acquisitiveness, antagonism and 
‘predation’. Moreover, such behaviour is regarded as accompanied by a taste for reputability, 
wealth and power and is more readily inclined to self-assertion, coercion and aggression, inducing 
individuals to exploit and dominate other people. This tendency may stem from the conflict that 
humans are involved in on account of universal scarcity (Commons, 1931; Fusfeld, 1977), or from 
the comparison that inevitably is made between persons in terms of their efficiency or creativity 
(Veblen, 1899, 1914). In any case, it is important to point out that the socioeconomic process bears 
the character of a struggle between people for the possession of goods, giving rise to this 
propensity for emulation and, in turn, to a number of social features and structures (such as status 
and power structures) which sustain and support this tendency (Searle, 2005). In modern economic 
life this propensity for emulation expresses itself in pecuniary emulation and competition to gain 
wealth, esteem and power. 
                                                 
25 Like all taxonomies these groupings are in a sense arbitrary, although they are generally derived from the 
original institutional economics of Veblen and Commons. 
26 In general, institutionalists use the concept of technology to define what in the current context is 
recognised as creativity (see for instance Ayres, 1962; DeGregori, 1977; Samuels, 1977; Bush, 1987). 
However the latter is preferred here as it discourages association of the notion with the common 
understanding and everyday use of the term technology. 
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The manner in which the above mentioned proclivities might express themselves is dependent upon 
cultural conditions (Veblen, 1914; Dewey, 1939a; Jensen, 1994; Stanfield, 1999; Bergstrom, 2002; 
Cordes, 2005). This is because these physio-psychological capacities and needs have been (and are 
being) formed in the course of a long process of social evolution, and so are substantially socially 
and culturally articulated. Attestation comes from a number of sources. The anthropologist Geertz 
(1973: 68), for instance, testifies that “…rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop, 
and extend organically based capacities genetically prior to it, it would seem to be an ingredient of 
these capacities themselves”. Similarly, Ayres (1962: 52, emphasis added) views culture as a 
“…phenomenon sui generis. It is not an epiphenomenon, a result of something else, explicable in 
other and non-cultural terms”, but rather “…the stuff of social behavior, the universe of discourse 
of the social sciences, the aspect which the data of observation assume at that level of 
generalization”. It is on this basis therefore that culture is perceived as simply an extension of 
human capability, and comprises the third element of this stratum. 
 
It is important to highlight that in the current context culture should be understood historically. It is 
the social heritage of collective mental and spiritual products and expressive forms of human 
conduct, which have been developed through time to define the frames of reference, systems of 
meaning and modes of cognition, action and conduct that guide actors in their social and economic 
life
27 (Mayhew, 1987; Archer et al, 1998). In other words, what differentiates culture from the 
institutional structures located in the higher layer is the time element
28. Although culture (both in 
its own terms and collectively with creativity and emulation) provides the basis for the 
development of the institutional infrastructure, it is the product of long past processes, whereas 
institutions are structural entities that define the cognition and behaviour of the actors of the 
present.  
 
This institutional environment is placed at the second ontological layer of socioeconomic reality. It 
consists of institutions, that is, the rules, rights, duties, norms, routines, relationships, practices, 
conventions and cognitive frameworks by which the society is currently organised. These 
institutional structures are not reducible either to patterns of events, facts or outcomes explicable in 
human action terms (topmost level), or to the fundamental universal traits of human nature (bottom 
level). However, this structural reality depends for its existence on human agency, which is 
characterised by diversity in behaviour and rationality. On these grounds institutions are perceived 
                                                 
27 In that sense culture is seen as a web of shared meanings external to each of its members but internal to all 
collectively. 
28 Interestingly Archer (1995) espouses a similar dualistic approach in cultural analysis by differentiating 
between Cultural Systems, the corpus of historically developed ‘intelligibilia’ (knowledge, beliefs, values 
and so forth), and the Socio-Cultural relations that exist between individuals and groups at a point in time. 
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transformational conception of institutional structures, depending upon both human intentionality 
and other ‘contingently related conditions’ and material circumstances, provides the basis to 
recognise the open and contingent nature of the socioeconomic world. 
 
The institutional environment is multidimensional. Four key components are identified although it 
is important to emphasise that these are necessarily interdependent and mutually reinforcing. 
Economic institutions refer to the structure of the economy. They concern the organisation of all 
markets (financial and asset markets as well as markets for goods and services and factors of 
production), and all non-market mechanisms for the allocation of scarce resources, along with the 
environment in which economic expectations and behaviour are shaped. Political institutions 
broadly define the structure of the polity, its basic cognitive and decision making structures and the 
explicit characteristics of agenda control, specifying political rights and establishing a set of power 
relations. Legal institutions, in turn, deal with the broad legal setting, providing a general 
framework of legislation and mechanisms for its interpretation and enforcement (including criminal 
and civil law codes as well as the court system). Finally, the institutions that are socially 
constructed and enforced
29 to resolve issues of conflict and to enhance coordination and 
workability in the socioeconomy are defined as social. They embrace cognitive frames (beliefs, 
ideologies), social conventions (customs, myths), codes of conduct (trust, reciprocity) and norms of 
behaviour (habits, morals, social values) that are either self- or societally imposed. 
 
It should already be clear that human capabilities, behavioural proclivities and the overall 
institutional framework set the parameters by which the socioeconomy operates. By defining states 
of affairs, they structure action and interaction among actors providing a degree of stability and 
predictability in socio-economic life. Against this background every situation presents a terrain of 
options, and it is upon this terrain that each actor pursues his/her own strategies. On these grounds 
it is argued here that both the deeper layer of human qualities and the institutional environment are 
connected to the topmost ‘actual’ level, which concerns both the organisational and factual 
outcomes that are evident in the socioeconomy. In particular, the topmost level is envisaged as a 
two sub-layer structure: one representing the actors involved and their organisational forms, and the 
other the concrete events and how these are actualised, experienced and understood by those 
players in their day-to-day life. Both the form of the organisational structure that comes into 
existence and the way it evolves are fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework. In 
turn, the way actors perceive events and outcomes has a retroactive effect on the organisational and 
                                                 
29 On account of the social relations in which humans are engaged.  
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these actors, and thus on overall socio-cultural evolution.  
 
 
5. Methodological implications 
 
The ontological perception laid down in the previous sections has substantial epistemological 
implications. Along critical realist lines it can argued that although structures, institutions, 
mechanisms, etc., exist independently of the way they are manifested or experienced, the only way 
to understand and express them is via ‘human mediation in cognitive discourse’. Intransitive social 
entities, though existentially independent of, are causally interdependent with the processes by 
which they are known. In these terms, knowledge is seen as both a social process and a product. It 
is historically and culturally specific, and its generation is an endless social activity of 
understanding and expressing these true entities. On this epistemic account, the task of social 
science is to advance knowledge, that is to (re)define and refine conceptual resources, in an attempt 
to expand and improve understanding of the structures, institutions, and mechanisms that account 
for the phenomena under investigation. To achieve this, emphasis has been placed on theory 
development (through abstraction) as the fundamental first step in doing social research. These 
theories are then assessed and reviewed in specific, actual situations, in a progressive, reflexive and 
essentially iterative manner, and if found to be empirically adequate (i.e. empirically realised or 
correspondent to reality)




This mode of research is identified as a combination of ‘retroduction’ (or ‘abduction’) and 
‘retrodiction’ (Lawson, 1997a). Retroduction refers to the inferential process that designates the 
causal mechanisms and posits them within a conceptual framework. Retrodiction, on the other 
hand, works at the empirical or applied level and refers to the explication and specification of the 
necessary generative structures and contingent conditions that account for the existence of actual 
phenomena. Analysis at this stage is based on the identification of empirical tendencies, 
                                                 
30 This, however, does not imply that theories can be discarded simply because expected empirical patterns 
do not materialise. Theories make their claims at the abstract level about causal powers that exist in virtue of 
their intrinsic structures or real essences, which may or may not be actualised or exercised. In addition, due to 
the open and contingent nature of the social world, a single mechanism may generate many outcomes, while 
similar outcomes may emerge as a result of different causal mechanisms.  
31 Note that original institutionalists, such as Veblen (1898), Myrdal (1958), Samuels (1990) and Hodgson 
(1998), also advocate a similar approach. For instance, Myrdal (1958: 156) sees theoretical research as an 
attempt to establish “…the causal relations between elementary factors in the social process”, whereas in 
practical research these causal relations “…are transposed into purposeful relations” (emphasis in the 
original). It is in that sense that practical explanations can be developed only on the basis of the theoretical 
analysis of structures and their causal powers. Theory, therefore, must always come before any empirical 
research. 
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causal mechanisms (Sayer, 1992; Yeung 1997). 
 
Translating this research mode to applicable methods and techniques of investigation, a pluralistic 
but critical research approach is utilised, combining both qualitative and quantitative 
perspectives
32. The purpose is not to seek out event regularities from which to claim universal 
laws, but to corroborate explanations that contribute towards proper understanding of the causal 
structures, mechanisms, institutions, and their relations. As these causal entities are contextual and 
historical in their realisation, understanding in this context refers to the process of constructing a 
unified system, and identifying the place of the entities under investigation in the pattern that 
characterises the ongoing process of change in that system. In that sense, and due to difficulties in 
quantifying essentially qualitative variables such as institutions, research relies less heavily upon 
statistical techniques, emphasising the use of ‘historical and comparative institutional analysis’ 
(HCIA) (Greif, 1998). Collection and organisation of information for HCIA is achieved by means 
of the case study method. 
 
The HCIA research employs historical techniques to explore the dynamic processes of emergence, 
evolution, and organisation of institutional structures, and comparative procedures over time and 
space to gain insights from different contexts. It is characterised by an ability to shift between a 
specific context and a general comparison, something which enables it to combine sensitivity to 
particular historical and cultural contexts with theoretical generalisations. In interpreting case 
studies and reaching conclusions within HCIA research, the institutionalist techniques of ‘story 
telling’ and ‘pattern modelling’ should be used, where historical situations are recounted and 
compared in an effort to define a wider pattern of relationships in a holistic manner.  
 
In an attempt to safeguard quality it is important to keep in mind the limitations and weaknesses 
that the approach entails. In virtue of its essentially qualitative and holistic nature, research relies 
on analytical description and emphasis on the context. On the surface, some of the detail may 
appear irrelevant, and, indeed, there is a risk of the researcher becoming too embroiled in 
descriptive detail. However, a considerably detailed account of what goes on in the setting being 
investigated is important because it provides a rich and contextual understanding of the institutional 
structures and dynamics. In that sense, institutional aspects and changes that may appear odd in the 
first place, can make perfect sense when the wider context within which they occur is taken into 
consideration.  
                                                 
32 Quantitative research helps to identify general patterns or tendencies with regard to the research questions. 
These patterns suggest the operation of causal mechanisms that are better explicated through qualitative 
research.  
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Another problem relates to the vast amount of information (both qualitative and quantitative) that is 
required for the examination of the phenomena under question. This, in addition to questions of 
information availability that may rise, attaches a subjective element to the research. Inevitably, the 
researcher inquires, selects, and focuses on specific aspects of socio-politico-economic life, and 
findings may rely heavily on his/her views about what is significant and essential. In this context 
what signifies ‘objectivity’ is an explicit statement of the value judgements used, and commitment 
to keeping the path of inquiry open and subject to identification and correction of errors. 
 
Another particularly important issue refers to whether it is possible to generalise the findings of the 
research across societies and different contexts. In general terms, empirically established 
knowledge of the causal powers and essential qualities of a mechanism is more widely applicable 
to other cases that represent similar theoretical conditions (Sayer, 1992; Lawson, 1997a). In this 
sense, generalisability is not a matter of ‘statistical generalisation’ (generalising from samples to 
the population), but a matter of ‘analytic generalisation’, in which examined cases are used to 
illustrate, represent and generalise to a theory. This means that verified causal/structural 
explanations are expected to apply to the majority of similar cases, although the particular details of 
the context being examined are too specific and could hardly form part of a generally applicable 
theory or a description of the phenomenon in general terms. 
 
 
6. Overview and conclusions 
 
This paper has put forward a CR interpretation of OIE to lay down a framework that advances 
conceptualisation of the institutional structures of the economic system and enriches understanding 
of the complex interrelation between the institutional environment and human agency. To achieve 
this, key elements from OIE were subsumed under the philosophical platform of CR. As indicated, 
CR has certain advantages over the other philosophical perspectives in discussing the institutional 
organisation of the economy. These mainly stem from its ontological arguments that, by 
dissociating institutional structure from human agency, allow focusing analysis on the institutional 
qualities, mechanisms and causal powers that characterise the economic system.  
 
Delineating the CR philosophical arguments, six fundamental premises about social reality were 
emphasised. In concise terms these are: 
1.  the ‘intransitivity’ of social structures, that is the argument that structures, institutions, 
mechanisms, etc. exist independently of their identification and the knowledge of which they 
are the object, 
  212.  the ‘stratification’ of the social world, that is the differentiation of social reality in distinct 
domains, or strata, which though unsynchronised are interconnected with one another, 
3.  the ‘transfactuality’ of generative qualities, that is the argument that mechanisms are always 
active, independently of whether they are being exercised, actualised, or perceived, 
4.  the ‘relational conception of the subject-matter of the social sciences’, that is the argument that 
all social entities presuppose a social context and depend upon social relations for their 
existence,  
5.  the ‘transformational model of social activity’, that is the argument that social reality possesses 
a non-teleologically evolving character by virtue of the agents’ potential to re-interpret, and 
collectively reproduce and transform, the structures they utilise and are shaped 
(constrained/enabled) by, and 
6.  the ‘temporal priority and separate identity of structure over agency’, that is the argument that 
at any moment in time social structures pre-exist individuals, who do not create them, but 
merely reproduce or transform them in their substantive activities. 
 
These philosophical tenets provided the basis for the development of a stratified ontological 
framework discussing the institutional organisation of the socioeconomy. In particular, a three-
layer, interlocked reality has been identified describing the complexity, multidimensionality, and 
dynamic character of the socioeconomic world. It was argued that deeper tendencies, capacities, 
‘instincts’ and qualities of the human essence (understood as ‘creativity’, ‘emulation’ and ‘culture’) 
condition the institutional environment (differentiated in economic, political, legal, and social 
terms), which in turn constitutes the terrain upon which organisational arrangements are manifested 
and socioeconomic events are actualised. In these terms, institutions were defined as ingrained 
regularities or established rules of human life that define agents’ perception, thoughts, behaviour 
and expectations, providing certainty and order in social interaction and economic organisation. 
 
In unveiling the nature and essence of institutions, a number of qualifications apply. Institutions are 
products of human agency, meaning that they exist (reproduced and transformed) by virtue of it. 
However, neither element can be reduced to, or conflated with the other. The fact that each 
individual is generally born into a world of pre-set institutions, proclaims the temporal priority, 
relative autonomy and causal efficacy of institutions over human agency. On that basis, the 
ontological and epistemological separability of institutions and human agents is recognised, placing 
institutions in a distinct layer of reality with its own emergent properties and qualities. Institutions 
are characterised by relative stability, continuity and self-reinforcement, since once established 
they come to endure merely through being an outcome of the daily activities in human life. 
However, they are manmade and changeable, evolving in an apparently slow but incremental 
fashion (identified as ‘cumulative causation’), where old institutions dismantle and new ones are 
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circumstances of human life. Yet, such a conception does not imply any deterministic or 
teleological view with regard to institutional change. The socioeconomy is seen as a complex and 
open-ended system where the variety of possibilities for interdependencies could account for 
widely differing outcomes  
 
Overall, the research programme put forward is holistic, evolutionary, critical and pluralistic. It is 
holistic because it takes into account the politico-socio-cultural dimensions of economic 
phenomena, it is evolutionary because it appreciates the dynamic character of the socioeconomic 
system, it is critical because it seeks understanding of the generative mechanisms, institutions and 
their relations which account for the phenomena under study, and it is pluralistic because it urge 
employment of both qualitative and qualitative information and methods in this quest for 
knowledge.  
 
Although the proposed methodological strategy sees theory development (through abstraction) as 
the first step in doing research, it also entails a significant empirical component. HCIA is regarded 
as the most appropriate approach for concrete analysis. It has been argued that such a combination 
of historical techniques (to explore the dynamic processes of institutional structures) and 
comparative procedures (to gain insights from different contexts), enables the establishment of 
theoretical generalisations and the achievement of rich understandings of institutional contexts. In 
reaching conclusions within HCIA research, the institutionalist techniques of ‘story telling’ and 
‘pattern modelling’ are to be employed, where historical situations are recounted and compared in 
an effort to define a wider pattern of relationships. 
 
This paper has set an agenda for study of the institutional structure of the socioeconomic system 
along CR lines. We hope it can provide a sound ground for further research and developments in 
the area that would enrich our understanding of the role and function of institutional structures. 
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